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'''2) Control of permitted rent change during change of tenant'''
 
&nbsp; &nbsp;a) same as within a tenant's tenure, in one of the ways above.<br/> ''&nbsp;[sometimes referred to as 'strong' rent control].&nbsp;''<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp;b) unregulated, i.e. "resets to market rate," aka there is&nbsp;''vacancy decontrol.&nbsp;''
 
&nbsp; &nbsp;b) unregulated, i.e. "resets to market rate," aka there is&nbsp;''vacancy decontrol.&nbsp;''
 
'''3) Regulation of which and when units may fall under or exist price regulation'''. Price regulation may apply:&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; a) Only to units built before a certain date; and/or<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; b) Only to units in buildings that reach a certain age (see "Deferred rent stabilization" below). &nbsp;''[This is uncommon (unknown?) in practice&nbsp;but often proposed].''<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; c) Only to units in buildings above a certain size.&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; d) not when a building is allowed to exit regulation for specified reasons, possibly including:&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; e) owner move-in. (as permitted by the&nbsp;"Ellis Act" in California).&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; f) conversion of unit from rental to ownership housing<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; i. "condo conversion" - from rental apartment to owned apartment, i.e.&nbsp;condominium<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; ii. Conversion to "[[Tenancy_in_Common|Tenancy in Common]]" (TIC) unit, i.e. shared ownership.&nbsp;&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; g) when unit rent increases above a certain point. (called "luxury decontrol" in NYC rent stablization law).&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; i. Condemnation (?)&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; ii. Demolition<br/> &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; iii. Lndlord buy-out of tenant.<br/> &nbsp;
&nbsp; &nbsp; a) Only to units built before a certain date; and/or
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; b) Only to units in buildings that reach a certain age (see "Deferred rent stabilization" below). &nbsp;''[This is uncommon (unknown?) in practice&nbsp;but often proposed].''
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; c) Only to units in buildings above a certain size.&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; d) not when a building is allowed to exit regulation for specified reasons, possibly including:&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; e) owner move-in. (as permitted by the&nbsp;"[[Ellis_Act|Ellis Act]]" in California).&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; f) conversion of unit from rental to ownership housing
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; i. "condo conversion" - from rental apartment to owned apartment. See also [[Condomium|Condomium]]
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; ii. Conversion to "[[Tenancy_in_Common|Tenancy in Common]]" (TIC) unit, i.e. shared ownership.&nbsp;&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; g) when unit rent increases above a certain point. (called "luxury decontrol" in NYC rent stablization law).&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; i. Condemnation (?)&nbsp;
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; ii. Demolition
 
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; iii. Lndlord buy-out of tenant.
 
&nbsp;
 
&nbsp;
 
&nbsp;
 
&nbsp;
 
== Rent control vs Rent stabilization ==
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In stricter usage,&nbsp;''rent control ''and "strong rent control" are typically used to refer to rental price regulation that is a) fixed price, and/or b) applies equally within and between tenancies, i.e. does not have ''vacancy decontrol''.&nbsp;
 
''Rent stabilization&nbsp;''typically refers to price regulation in which a) permitted rent adjusts variably, e.g. based on a price index, and/or b) permitted rent for new tenants is unregulated, i.e. there is&nbsp;''vacancy decontrol.&nbsp;''<br/> &nbsp;
 
&nbsp;
 
== Vacancy control or decontrol ==
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== Current rent regulations ==
 
=== California&nbsp; ===
 
=== San Francisco ===
 
=== Oakland ===
 
=== San Jose<br/> &nbsp; ===
 
== SF rent control study by Diamond, McQuade, Qian (2017) ==
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We reviewed the paper versions he cites from September 26 and November 29, and also one from October 11. It appears to me, that the change results from a recalculation of both the estimated welfare benefits and welfare losses into the same Present Discounted Value terms. (Whereas before people were e.g. taking a figure of $423M/yr benefit and multiplying by 17 years of study period to get $7.19B in benefit).&nbsp;
 
We emailed the three paper co-authors on Tues 30-1-2018 to ask them if this explained the difference or if there was another explanation.&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp;
 
*26 September, 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=1zjClPSHvzBx7LpSaD56I8FdWuFiXrdRq PDF].<br/> Abstract<br/> "In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control due to a 1994 ballot initiative to study the welfare impacts of rent control on its tenant bene􏰁ciariesbeneficiaries as well as the impact on landlords' responses and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual's migration over time, we fi􏰁ndfind that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their 1994 address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, using data on the history of individual parcels in San Francisco, we 􏰁findfind that treated landlords reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7% and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form eff􏰀ectseffects. We 􏰁findfind that rent control off􏰀eredoffered large bene􏰁fitsbenefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $3100 and $5900 per person each year, with aggregate bene􏰁tsbenefits totaling over $423 million annually. The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."<br/> <br/> "We fi􏰁ndfind that rent control o􏰀fferedoffered large benefi􏰁tsbenefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $3100 and $5900 per person each year, with aggregate benefi􏰁tsbenefits totaling over $423 million annually. These e􏰀ectseffects are counterbalanced by landlords reducing&nbsp;supply in response to the introduction of the law. We conclude that this led to a city-wide rent increase of 7% and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters."<br/> &nbsp;
*11 October, 2017. NBER working paper.&nbsp;[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf].<br/> ''"Abstract:&nbsp;<br/> In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual’s migration over time,&nbsp;'''we find that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we find that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7%&nbsp;'''and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form effects. We find that&nbsp;'''rent control offered large benefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with aggregate benefits totaling over $390 million annually.'''&nbsp;The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."''<br/> &nbsp;
*29 November 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=13pzS8XOAHXgvWdT6ddeoFy123Y_hoJ4y PDF].&nbsp;<br/> Abstract:<br/> "In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual's migration over time, we fi􏰁ndfind that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we 􏰁findfind that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 5.1% and caused $2.9 billion of total loss to renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form eff􏰀ectseffects. We 􏰁ndfind that rent control o􏰀fferedoffered large bene􏰁fitsbenefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with the present discounted value of aggregate benefi􏰁tsbenefits totaling $2.9 billion. The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."<br/> <br/> "We fi􏰁ndfind that rent control off􏰀eredoffered large bene􏰁fitsbenefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with aggregate bene􏰁fitsbenefits totaling over $214 million annually, with present discounted value of $2.9 billion. These e􏰀ffectseffects are counterbalanced by landlords reducing supply in response to the introduction of the law. We conclude that this led to a city-wide rent increase of 5.1%. At a discount rate of 5%, this has a present discounted value of $2.9 billion dollars lost by tenents."
 
&nbsp;
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See main article: [[Costa-Hawkins_Rental_Housing_Act_reform|Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing_Act reform]]
 
&nbsp;
 
&nbsp;
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*Ambrosius, Joshua D. et al [2015].&nbsp;“Forty years of rent control: Reexamining New Jersey’s moderate local policies after the great recession,” Cities, 49, pp. 121–133.&nbsp;December 2015.&nbsp;[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.08.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.08.001].<br/> &nbsp;
*Arnott, Richard. “[https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.99 Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?]” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995: Vol. 9, №1: 99–120.<br/> [https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.99 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.99].<br/> Abstract: "Economists' traditional hostility to rent contols is based on models that treat the housing market as perfectly competitive and on the experience with 'hard' controls in New York City and many European countries following World War II. The current 'soft' rent control systems in North America are varied and qualitatively different from earlier hard controls. The theoretical case against them is weak, particularly when the housing market is viewed as imperfectly competitive. The empirical case against them is weak, too. Economists should reconsider their blanket opposition to current rent control systems and evaluate them on a case-by-case basis."<br/> &nbsp;
*Autor, D.H. , and C J Palmer, P A Pathak [2014]. "[https://doi.org/10.1086/675536 Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts]." Journal of Political Economy, volume 122, p. 661-717. June 2014<br/> [https://doi.org/10.1086/675536.  https://doi.org/10.1086/675536.&nbsp;]<br/> &nbsp;
*Barton, Stephen. "[http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2019/0119barton.html The Economics of Residential Rent Control]." Dollars and Sense, Jan/Feb 2019. [http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2019/0119barton.html http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2019/0119barton.html].<br/> &nbsp;
*Chew, &nbsp;Amee, and Sarah Treuhaft. "Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities." PolicyLink, February 2019. [https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/our-homes-our-future. https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/our-homes-our-future.&nbsp;]<br/> <br/> ''"Multiple longitudinal studies of rent control in New Jersey have found no discernible impact on construction rates.<sup>(73)</sup> After the repeal of rent control in Boston, construction rates decreased for multifamily buildings, even as rents nearly doubled in eight years.<sup>(74)</sup>''<br/> <br/> ''<sup>(73)</sup>"As have studies in the Bay Area, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Washington DC, and elsewhere. &nbsp;''<br/> ''Ambrosius et al., “Forty Years of Rent Control”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Gilderbloom and Ye, “Thirty Years of Rent Control”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Gilderbloom, “Moderate Rent Control”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Zuk, “Rent Control: The Key to Neighborhood Stabilization?”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Planning & Development Department, “Rent Control in the City of Berkeley, 1978 to 1994”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Baar, Burns, and Flaming, “San Jose ARO Study,” 177;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Keating, Teitz, and Skaburskis, eds., Rent Control.''''<br/> <br/> <sup>(74)</sup> Chen, “When Rent Control Just Vanishes; Both Sides of Debate Cite Boston’s Example”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Collins, “Rent Regulation in New York”;&nbsp;''<br/> ''Dreier, “Rent Deregulation in California and Massachusetts.”''<br/> &nbsp; ▼
*Chew, &nbsp;Amee, and Sarah Treuhaft. "Our Homes, Our Future: How Rent Control Can Build Stable, Healthy Communities." PolicyLink, February 2019. [https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/our-homes-our-future.  https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/our-homes-our-future.&nbsp;]
 
''"Multiple longitudinal studies of rent control in New Jersey have found no discernible impact on construction rates.<sup>(73)</sup> After the repeal of rent control in Boston, construction rates decreased for multifamily buildings, even as rents nearly doubled in eight years.<sup>(74)</sup>''
 
▲''<sup>(73)</sup> "As have studies in the Bay Area, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Washington DC, and elsewhere. &nbsp;<br/> Ambrosius et al., “Forty Years of Rent Control”;&nbsp;<br/> Gilderbloom and Ye, “Thirty Years of Rent Control”;&nbsp;<br/> Gilderbloom, “Moderate Rent Control”;&nbsp;<br/> Zuk, “Rent Control: The Key to Neighborhood Stabilization?”;&nbsp;<br/> Planning & Development Department, “Rent Control in the City of Berkeley, 1978 to 1994”;&nbsp;<br/> Baar, Burns, and Flaming, “San Jose ARO Study,” 177;&nbsp;<br/> Keating, Teitz, and Skaburskis, eds., Rent Control.<br/> <br/> <sup>(74)</sup> Chen, “When Rent Control Just Vanishes; Both Sides of Debate Cite Boston’s Example”;&nbsp;<br/> Collins, “Rent Regulation in New York”;&nbsp;<br/> Dreier, “Rent Deregulation in California and Massachusetts.”''
 
*Diamond, Rebecca, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian (2017). “[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco].”
**26 September, 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=1zjClPSHvzBx7LpSaD56I8FdWuFiXrdRq PDF].
**11 October, 2017. NBER working paper.&nbsp;[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf].
**29 November 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=13pzS8XOAHXgvWdT6ddeoFy123Y_hoJ4y PDF].&nbsp;<br/> &nbsp;
 
 
*Early, Dirk, and Jon Phelps (1999). &nbsp;"Rent Regulations' Pricing Effect in the Uncontrolled Sector: An Empirical Investigation." Journal of Housing Research: 1999, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 267-285. DOI: 10.5555/jhor.10.2.j11873517nq95773. &nbsp;<br/> &nbsp;
*East Bay For Everyone. "[https://www.scribd.com/document/350029454/Ab-1506-Support#from_embed RE: AB 1506 - Residential Rent Control: Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act.]" (letter). 2017.&nbsp;[https://www.scribd.com/document/350029454/Ab-1506-Support#from_embed https://www.scribd.com/document/350029454/Ab-1506-Support#from_embed].<br/> &nbsp;
*Favilukis, Jack Y and Mabille, Pierre and Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn. "[https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265918 Affordable Housing and City Welfare]." (May 24, 2019). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-77. &nbsp;Available at SSRN: [https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265918 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265918] or [http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265918 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3265918].<br/> <br/> ''"We model rent control (RC) as mandatory inclusionary housing, a policy that requires developers to set aside a fraction of rental housing to low-income households at below market rates and is allocated by lottery. "''<br/> <br/> ''"We also find a lower housing stock and higher rents from a RC expansion, but an aggregate welfare gain for the entire MSA in spatial equilibrium."''<br/> <br/> ''"Direct measurement on the number of mandatory inclusionary housing units is not available. Nor is it appropriate given that there are many more af- fordable housing units from a range of programs. We de ne RC housing as all housing units that are (i) rent controlled, (ii) public housing, (iii) Mitchell Lama housing, (iv) all other government-assisted or regulated housing."''<br/> &nbsp;
*Gilderbloom, John I. [1981]. "Moderate Rent Control: Its Impact on the Quality and Quantity of the Housing Stock." ''Urban Affairs Quarterly'' 17, no. 2 (Dec 1981).<br/> &nbsp; ▼
 
*Gilderbloom, John I., and Richard P. Appelbaum. [1988]. ''Rethinking Rental Housing'' (Temple University Press, 1988).<br/> &nbsp; ▼
''"We model rent control (RC) as mandatory inclusionary housing, a policy that requires developers to set aside a fraction of rental housing to low-income households at below market rates and is allocated by lottery. "''
*Gilderbloom, John I., and Lin Ye. [2007]. "[https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cBR_YmIhhljXBWF2nm2W09TOPBxQn6s3 Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Survey of New Jersey Cities]." Journal of Urban Affairs 29, no. 2 (2007): 207–20. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.2007.00334.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.2007.00334.x]. PDF: [https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cBR_YmIhhljXBWF2nm2W09TOPBxQn6s3 https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cBR_YmIhhljXBWF2nm2W09TOPBxQn6s3].<br/> &nbsp; ▼
 
''"We also find a lower housing stock and higher rents from a RC expansion, but an aggregate welfare gain for the entire MSA in spatial equilibrium."''
 
''"Direct measurement on the number of mandatory inclusionary housing units is not available. Nor is it appropriate given that there are many more af- fordable housing units from a range of programs. We de ne RC housing as all housing units that are (i) rent controlled, (ii) public housing, (iii) Mitchell Lama housing, (iv) all other government-assisted or regulated housing."''
 
*&nbsp;
 
▲Gilderbloom, John I. [1981]. "Moderate Rent Control: Its Impact on the Quality and Quantity of the Housing Stock." ''Urban Affairs Quarterly'' 17, no. 2 (Dec 1981).
 
*&nbsp;
 
▲Gilderbloom, John I., and Richard P. Appelbaum. [1988]. ''Rethinking Rental Housing'' (Temple University Press, 1988).
 
*&nbsp;
 
▲Gilderbloom, John I., and Lin Ye. [2007]. "[https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cBR_YmIhhljXBWF2nm2W09TOPBxQn6s3 Thirty Years of Rent Control: A Survey of New Jersey Cities]." Journal of Urban Affairs 29, no. 2 (2007): 207–20. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.2007.00334.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.2007.00334.x]. PDF: [https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cBR_YmIhhljXBWF2nm2W09TOPBxQn6s3 https://drive.google.com/open?id=1cBR_YmIhhljXBWF2nm2W09TOPBxQn6s3].
 
*Gordon, Leslie. “[http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%202018%20Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf Strengthening Communities through Rent Control and Just-Cause Evictions: Case Studies from Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Richmond.]” Urban Habitat (Oakland, CA), January 2018.&nbsp;<br/> [http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%202018%20Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%202018%20Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf].<br/> &nbsp;
*Heskin, Allan D., Ned Levine & Mark Garrett. “The Effects of Vacancy Control: A Spatial Analysis of Four California Cities.” ''Journal of the American Planning Association'', Volume 66, 2000 - Issue 2, Pages 162-176. DOI: 10.1080/01944360008976096.&nbsp;<br/> [https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360008976096 https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360008976096]<br/> ''“Abstract:&nbsp;<br/> This article examines changes between 1980 and 1990 in the number of rental units and the demographic composition of tenants in four California cities that adopted rent control with vacancy control provisions. Six border areas within the four cities were compared to border areas of adjoining cities that did not have vacancy control. A spatial lag regression model was constructed to estimate the changes in regional and neighborhood components in addition to vacancy control policies. Vacancy control contributed to lower rents and longer tenure by tenants compared to non-vacancy-controlled areas. There were also fewer rental units in part because of a shift from rental housing to owner-occupied housing.”''<br/> &nbsp;
*Initiative on Global Markets (at University of Chicago Booth School) [IGM 2012]. “[http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control Rent Control]” [poll of economic experts].&nbsp;<br/> February 7th, 2012.&nbsp;[http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control. http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control.&nbsp;]<br/> ''Poll statement:&nbsp; “Local ordinances that limit rent increases for some rental housing units, such as in New York and San Francisco, have had a positive impact over the past three decades on the amount and quality of broadly affordable rental housing in cities that have used them.”&nbsp;<br/> 40 respondents.&nbsp;<br/> 0 Strongly Agree<br/> 2% Agree<br/> 7% Uncertain<br/> 49% Disagree<br/> 32% Strongly Disagree<br/> 2% No Opinion''<br/> &nbsp;
*Jenkins, Blair [2009]. "Rent Control: Do Economists Agree?" ''Econ Journal Watch'' [American Institute for Economic Research], Vol 6, No 1, January 2009. pp 73-112.&nbsp;<br/> [https://econjwatch.org/articles/rent-control-do-economists-agree https://econjwatch.org/articles/rent-control-do-economists-agree].<br/> &nbsp;
*Keating, Teitz, and Skaburskis, eds.&nbsp;''Rent Control: Regulation and the Rental Housing Market''.&nbsp;Center For Urban Policy Research, 1998.<br/> Available for online line from Internet Archive:&nbsp;[https://archive.org/details/rentcontrolregul00keat.  https://archive.org/details/rentcontrolregul00keat.&nbsp;]<br/> &nbsp;
*Kurtek, Sanela. "[https://torontoism.com/toronto-news/2017/12/rent-controls-toronto Why Rent Controls are Such a Problem for Toronto]."&nbsp;''Torontoism,&nbsp;''December 18, 2017.<br/> [https://torontoism.com/toronto-news/2017/12/rent-controls-toronto https://torontoism.com/toronto-news/2017/12/rent-controls-toronto].<br/> &nbsp;
*Legislative Analysts Office (California).&nbsp;[http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2017/170629.pdf Review of proposed statutory initiative pertaining to rent control (A.G. File No. 17-0041)].&nbsp;12 Dec 2017. [http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2017/170629.pdf http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2017/170629.pdf].<br/> &nbsp;
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*&nbsp;
 
National Multifamily Housing Council. "[https://www.nmhc.org/news/articles/the-high-cost-of-rent-control The High Cost of Rent Control]." [undated]. [https://www.nmhc.org/news/articles/the-high-cost-of-rent-control/.  https://www.nmhc.org/news/articles/the-high-cost-of-rent-control/.&nbsp;]
 
''"Inhibition of New Construction:<br/> "By forcing rents below the market price, rent control reduces the profitability of rental housing, directing investment capital out of the rental market and into other more profitable markets. Construction declines and existing rental housing is converted to other uses.''
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*Niemietz, Kristian. "How Germany Made Rent Control "Work": Rent Control "Works" when It ... Doesn't Control Rents." FEE.org,&nbsp;June 03, 2016.&nbsp;[https://fee.org/articles/how-germany-made-rent-control-work/. https://fee.org/articles/how-germany-made-rent-control-work/. ]<br/> &nbsp;
*Olsen, Edgar [1972]. &nbsp;An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control. Journal of Political Economy 80(6):1081-100. DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1086/259959 https://doi.org/10.1086/259959]. PDF: [https://drive.google.com/openid=1AKUdayTtyQTObdLRTb7v2r5sOkHj1I-a https://drive.google.com/openid=1AKUdayTtyQTObdLRTb7v2r5sOkHj1I-a].<br/> [an early and seemingly often-cited paper].&nbsp;<br/> <br/> ''"The cost of producing a unit of housing service in a controlled apartment will be higher than the cost of producing a unit in the uncontrolled market. &nbsp;The argument is as follows. From the viewpoint of technical efficiency in the production of housing service, there is an optimal path of deterioration for each dwelling. The operation of a competitive housing market results in the attainment of this optimal path. Rent control results in a faster-than-optimal rate of deterioration. Therefore, rent control results in a higher unit cost of producing housing service in the controlled market."''<br/> <br/> ''"It seems quite likely that the cost of producing housing service in the uncontrolled market is higher than it would have been had rent control been terminated in New York City shortly after the Second World War. &nbsp;The existence of rent control in New York City probably makes the owners of uncontrolled rental housing sensitive to the possibility of changes in the rent-control law which would inflict capital losses on them. Indeed, in 1969 a mild form of rent control was extended to more than half of the then-uncontrolled rental stock...Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that investors in rental housing in New York City will demand and receive a higher-risk premium. If this argument is correct, then contrary to one of the assumptions underlying the empirical results in this paper, the long-run supply price of housing service in the uncontrolled market in 1968 was greater than it would have been had rent control never gone into effect in New York City. This implies that the occupants of uncontrolled housing were worse off than they would have been in the absence of rent control."''<br/> &nbsp;
*Painter, Gary. "Op-Ed: No, rent control doesn’t always reduce the supply of housing." LA Times, Oct 31, 2018. [https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-painter-rent-control-economist-20181031-story.html.  https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-painter-rent-control-economist-20181031-story.html.&nbsp;]<br/> cites USC Pastor study.<br/> &nbsp;
*Pastor, Manuel, Vanessa Carter, and Maya Abood. "[https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/%20docs/Rent_Matters_PERE_Report_Final_02.pdf Rent Matters: What Are the Impacts of Rent Stabilization Measures?]" (USC Program for Environmental & Re- gional Equity, 2018), [https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/ https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/] docs/Rent_Matters_PERE_Report_Final_02.pdf.
 
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