Rent regulation: Difference between revisions

 

 

 

== <br/> Price regulation variant forms ==

##change based on political/regulatory decision, e.g. municipal Rent Board decision.<br/> ''[when permitted rent change is adjustable this way, and/or it is unregulated upon vacancy, the system is sometimes called 'modern' or 'second-generation' rent controls.]''

##possibly (and typically), other changes are permitted by landlord petition or e.g. to "pass through" expenses such as tax increase or renovation costs.

#Control of permitted rent change during change of tenant

##same as within a tenant's tenure, in one of the ways above.<br/> ''&nbsp;[sometimes referred to as 'strong' rent control].&nbsp;''

##unregulated, i.e. "resets to market rate," aka there is&nbsp;''vacancy decontrol.&nbsp;''

#Regulation of which and when units may fall under or exist price regulation. Price regulation may apply:&nbsp;

##Only to units built before a certain date; and/or

####eg. "condo conversion".

####conversion to "Tenancy in Common" (TIC) unit, i.e. shared ownership.&nbsp;&nbsp;

###when unit rent increases above a certain point. (called "luxury decontrol" in NYC rent stablization law).&nbsp;

###landlord buy-out of tenant.

###demolition

###condemnation (?)&nbsp;

 

 

 

=== San Jose<br/> &nbsp; ===

 

== SF rent control study by Diamond, McQuade, Qian (2017) ==

 

Diamond, Rebecca, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian (2017). “[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco].”

 

*26 September, 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=1zjClPSHvzBx7LpSaD56I8FdWuFiXrdRq PDF].<br/> Abstract<br/> "In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control due to a 1994 ballot initiative to study the welfare impacts of rent control on its tenant bene􏰁ciaries as well as the impact on landlords' responses and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual's migration over time, we fi􏰁nd that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their 1994 address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, using data on the history of individual parcels in San Francisco, we 􏰁find that treated landlords reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7% and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form eff􏰀ects. We 􏰁find that rent control off􏰀ered large bene􏰁fits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $3100 and $5900 per person each year, with aggregate bene􏰁ts totaling over $423 million annually. The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."<br/> <br/> "We fi􏰁nd that rent control o􏰀ffered large benefi􏰁ts to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $3100 and $5900 per person each year, with aggregate benefi􏰁ts totaling over $423 million annually. These e􏰀ects are counterbalanced by landlords reducing&nbsp;supply in response to the introduction of the law. We conclude that this led to a city-wide rent increase of 7% and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters."<br/> &nbsp;

*11 October, 2017. NBER working paper.&nbsp;[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf].<br/> ''"Abstract:&nbsp;<br/> In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual’s migration over time,&nbsp;'''we find that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we find that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7%&nbsp;'''and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form effects. We find that&nbsp;'''rent control offered large benefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with aggregate benefits totaling over $390 million annually.'''&nbsp;The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."''<br/> &nbsp;

 

== California 'Costa-Hawkins' law repeal initiative ==