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*Arnott, Richard. “[https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.99 Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?]” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995: Vol. 9, №1: 99–120.<br/> [https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.99 https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.9.1.99].<br/> Abstract: "Economists' traditional hostility to rent contols is based on models that treat the housing market as perfectly competitive and on the experience with 'hard' controls in New York City and many European countries following World War II. The current 'soft' rent control systems in North America are varied and qualitatively different from earlier hard controls. The theoretical case against them is weak, particularly when the housing market is viewed as imperfectly competitive. The empirical case against them is weak, too. Economists should reconsider their blanket opposition to current rent control systems and evaluate them on a case-by-case basis."<br/> &nbsp;
*Diamond, Rebecca, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian (2017). “[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco].”
*Diamond, Rebecca, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian (2017). “[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco].” NBER working paper, October 11, 2017.&nbsp;[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf].<br/> ''"Abstract:&nbsp;<br/> In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual’s migration over time,&nbsp;'''we find that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we find that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7%&nbsp;'''and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form effects. We find that&nbsp;'''rent control offered large benefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with aggregate benefits totaling over $390 million annually.'''&nbsp;The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."''<br/> &nbsp; ▼
**26 September, 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=1zjClPSHvzBx7LpSaD56I8FdWuFiXrdRq PDF].<br/> Abstract<br/> "In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control due to a 1994 ballot initiative to study the welfare impacts of rent control on its tenant bene􏰁ciaries as well as the impact on landlords' responses and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual's migration over time, we fi􏰁nd that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their 1994 address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, using data on the history of individual parcels in San Francisco, we 􏰁find that treated landlords reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7% and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form e􏰀ects. We 􏰁nd that rent control o􏰀ered large bene􏰁ts to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $3100 and $5900 per person each year, with aggregate bene􏰁ts totaling over $423 million annually. The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."<br/> &nbsp;
▲*Diamond,*11 RebeccaOctober, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian (2017). “[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco].” NBER working paper, October 11, 2017.&nbsp;[http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/PEf17/Diamond_McQuade_Qian.pdf].<br/> ''"Abstract:&nbsp;<br/> In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual’s migration over time,&nbsp;'''we find that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we find that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7%&nbsp;'''and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form effects. We find that&nbsp;'''rent control offered large benefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with aggregate benefits totaling over $390 million annually.'''&nbsp;The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."''<br/> &nbsp;
**29 November 2017 version. [https://drive.google.com/open?id=13pzS8XOAHXgvWdT6ddeoFy123Y_hoJ4y PDF].&nbsp;<br/> Abstract:<br/> "In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual's migration over time, we fi􏰁nd that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we 􏰁find that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 5.1% and caused $2.9 billion of total loss to renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form eff􏰀ects. We 􏰁nd that rent control o􏰀ffered large bene􏰁fits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with the present discounted value of aggregate benefi􏰁ts totaling $2.9 billion. The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords."<br/> &nbsp;
 
*East Bay For Everyone. "[https://www.scribd.com/document/350029454/Ab-1506-Support#from_embed RE: AB 1506 - Residential Rent Control: Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act.]" (letter). 2017.&nbsp;[https://www.scribd.com/document/350029454/Ab-1506-Support#from_embed https://www.scribd.com/document/350029454/Ab-1506-Support#from_embed].<br/> &nbsp;
*Gordon, Leslie. “[http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%202018%20Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf Strengthening Communities through Rent Control and Just-Cause Evictions: Case Studies from Berkeley, Santa Monica, and Richmond.]” Urban Habitat (Oakland, CA), January 2018.&nbsp;<br/> [http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%202018%20Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf http://urbanhabitat.org/sites/default/files/UH%202018%20Strengthening%20Communities%20Through%20Rent%20Control.pdf].<br/> &nbsp;
*Heskin, Allan D., Ned Levine & Mark Garrett. “The Effects of Vacancy Control: A Spatial Analysis of Four California Cities.” ''Journal of the American Planning Association'', Volume 66, 2000 - Issue 2, Pages 162-176. DOI: 10.1080/01944360008976096.&nbsp;<br/> [https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360008976096 https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360008976096]<br/> ''“Abstract:&nbsp;<br/> This article examines changes between 1980 and 1990 in the number of rental units and the demographic composition of tenants in four California cities that adopted rent control with vacancy control provisions. Six border areas within the four cities were compared to border areas of adjoining cities that did not have vacancy control. A spatial lag regression model was constructed to estimate the changes in regional and neighborhood components in addition to vacancy control policies. Vacancy control contributed to lower rents and longer tenure by tenants compared to non-vacancy-controlled areas. There were also fewer rental units in part because of a shift from rental housing to owner-occupied housing.”''<br/> &nbsp;
*Initiative on Global Markets (at University of Chicago Booth School) [IGM 2012]. “[http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control Rent Control]” [poll of economic experts].&nbsp;<br/> February 7th, 2012.&nbsp;[http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control. http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/rent-control.&nbsp;]<br/> ''Poll statement:&nbsp; “Local ordinances that limit rent increases for some rental housing units, such as in New York and San Francisco, have had a positive impact over the past three decades on the amount and quality of broadly affordable rental housing in cities that have used them.”&nbsp;<br/> 40 respondents.&nbsp;<br/> 0 Strongly Agree<br/> 2% Agree<br/> 7% Uncertain<br/> 49% Disagree<br/> 32% Strongly Disagree<br/> 2% No Opinion''<br/> &nbsp;
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