Reading List: Difference between revisions

*Hills, Roderick M, Jr, and David Schleicher. [http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2015/9/regulation-v38n3-1.pdf "Can ‘Planning’ Deregulate land use?"]&nbsp;Regulation&nbsp;(Cato Institute), Fall 2015. &nbsp;[https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2015/9/regulation-v38n3-1.pdf https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2015/9/regulation-v38n3-1.pdf], &nbsp;<br/> ''"To overcome NIMBY politics and development constraints, urban areas&nbsp;should consider binding, comprehensive, citywide plans."''<br/> &nbsp;

*Hills, Roderick M. Hills, and&nbsp;David Schleicher.&nbsp;"[https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-101-issue-1/planning-an-affordable-city/ Planning an Affordable City.]" 101 Iowa Law Review&nbsp;91 (2015).<br/> [https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-101-issue-1/planning-an-affordable-city/ https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/print/volume-101-issue-1/planning-an-affordable-city/].<br/> <br/>''&nbsp; &nbsp; "The solution to this housing crisis is economically simple but politically difficult. As a matter of economic rationality, local governments should deregulate their housing markets to allow an increased housing supply to meet a rising demand for housing. As a political matter, however, incumbent residents who already own housing vociferously and effectively protest against the reduction of zoning restrictions."<br/> <br/>&nbsp; &nbsp; "How, then, to free up urban land markets from the stranglehold of zoning driven by NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) neighbors? We argue, paradoxically, that the solution to excessive zoning is centralized, comprehensive, and binding land-use planning."<br/> <br/>&nbsp; &nbsp; "We argue in Part III.A that binding, comprehensive plans allow legislators to create “contracts” across electoral districts that are otherwise impossible when zoning proceeds through piecemeal lot-by-lot bargaining." [[Comprehensive_plan|Comprehensive plan]].&nbsp;<br/> <br/>&nbsp; &nbsp; "We argue in Part III.B that parcel-by-parcel bargaining imposes high information costs on outside investors, thereby reducing the market for investment in new housing to a handful of local insiders with incentives to constrain supply."<br/> <br/>&nbsp; &nbsp;"Prescriptions below in Part IV, including the idea that mayors and city planning departments ought to regularly redraw the citywide zoning map to comprehend all pending development proposals, a process that would look something like an annual budgeting process. [see [[Zoning_budget|Zoning budget]] -Yimbywiki].&nbsp;Other proposals include fixed prices, defined ex ante in the zoning ordinance, for additional building rights [see [[Transfer_of_development_rights|Transfer of development rights]] -Yimbywiki]&nbsp;and prohibitions on any downzoning until citywide housing goals, defined with hard figures like vacancy rates or building permits issued, are met."&nbsp;&nbsp;''<br/> &nbsp;

*Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Enrico Moretti. "[http://eml.berkeley.edu//~moretti/growth.pdf Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation]." Working paper, May 18, 2017. [http://eml.berkeley.edu//~moretti/growth.pdf http://eml.berkeley.edu//~moretti/growth.pdf].<br/> <br/> [earlier version: &nbsp;Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Enrico Moretti. &nbsp;"Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate Growth." NBER Working Paper 21154, 2015. [http://www.nber.org/papers/w21154 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21154]. Preprint: &nbsp;[http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=housing_law_and_policy http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&context=housing_law_and_policy].]<br/> &nbsp;

*<span style="font-size: 13px;">Lens, Michael C., and Paavo Monkkonen. "</span>[http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2015-04WP.pdf Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas More Segregated by Income?]<span style="font-size: 13px;">" Journal of the American Planning Association, Volume 82, 2016 - Issue 1. Published online 2015-12-28.&nbsp;DOI.&nbsp;</span><br/> <span style="font-size: 13px;">UCLA Working Paper:</span><span style="font-size: 13px;">&nbsp;</span><span style="font-size: 13px;">[http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2015-04WP.pdf. http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2015-04WP.pdf.&nbsp;]</span><br/> &nbsp;

**''Progress and Poverty.&nbsp;''Modernized edition by Bob Drake, 2006.&nbsp;[http://www.henrygeorge.org/pintro.htm http://www.henrygeorge.org/pintro.htm].|<br/> &nbsp;

*Levy, John M. ''Contemporary Urban Planning'' (9th Edition, 2010).<br/> &nbsp;

*Rothstein, Richard. ''The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America''. 2017.<br/> &nbsp;

*Ryan-Collins, Josh,‎ Toby Lloyd,‎ Laurie Macfarlane. ''Rethinking the Economics of Land and Housing''. Zed Books. 2017.&nbsp; -&nbsp;<br/> ''A&nbsp;guide to the role of land in housing policy and how it has been excluded from mainstream economic theory. The "authors reveal how many of the key challenges facing modern economies - including housing crises, financial instability and growing inequalities - are intimately tied to the land economy. Looking at the ways in which discussions of land have been routinely excluded from both housing policy and economic theory, the authors show that in order to tackle these increasingly pressing issues a major rethink by both politicians and economists is required."''<br/> ​​​​​​​