NIMBY: Difference between revisions

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=== Pendall [1999] ===
=== Pendall [1999] ===
<blockquote>
''"When reduced to its most literal interpretation of 'not in my backyard,'&nbsp;the term NIMBY connotes a selfish desire to abdicate responsibility for important community facilities. Where housing is concerned, NIMBY is a label most commonly applied to people who oppose subsidized dwellings, group homes, and shelters for the homeless. But in recent years, homebuilders and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under Secretary Kemp have painted all opposition to housing with this broad NIMBY brush (Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1991). This interpretation of opposition to housing extends to the academic literature as well (Frieden 1979). Yet opponents cite myriad reasons for changing or stopping new housing projects. In this article, I presume that we can learn much more about the planning and development process by taking these concerns at face value...''


''"I do not presume to establish generalized rules about protests against housing. In fact, I have the opposite intent: to counter attempts to sup- press protest by labeling it with a general, pejorative term and to encourage the search for seeds of truth within protest."''
When reduced to its most literal interpretation of “not in my backyard,the term NIMBY connotes a selfish desire to abdicate responsibility for important community facilities. Where housing is concerned, NIMBY is a label most commonly applied to people who oppose subsidized dwellings, group homes, and shelters for the homeless. But in recent years, homebuilders and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under Secretary Kemp have painted all opposition to housing with this broad NIMBY brush (Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1991). This interpretation of opposition to housing extends to the academic literature as well (Frieden 1979). Yet opponents cite myriad reasons for changing or stopping new housing projects. In this article, I presume that we can learn much more about the planning and development process by taking these concerns at face value...

"I do not presume to establish generalized rules about protests against housing. In fact, I have the opposite intent: to counter attempts to sup- press protest by labeling it with a general, pejorative term and to encourage the search for seeds of truth within protest."

"Fiscal impact studies tend to show that most housing types generate less property tax reve- nue than they demand in local services (Livingston and Blayney 1971; Hughes 1974; Commonwealth Research Group, Inc. 1995)."

"Residential developments provoke controversy for many different reasons, especially in a setting that has a highly educated, politically active, and environmentally concerned citizenry such as the San Francisco Bay Area....Antigrowth and NIMBY protests were both more com- mon in jurisdictions with lower median incomes."


''"Fiscal impact studies tend to show that most housing types generate less property tax reve- nue than they demand in local services (Livingston and Blayney 1971; Hughes 1974; Commonwealth Research Group, Inc. 1995)."''
</blockquote> <blockquote>
''"Residential developments provoke controversy for many different reasons, especially in a setting that has a highly educated, politically active, and environmentally concerned citizenry such as the San Francisco Bay Area....Antigrowth and NIMBY protests were both more com- mon in jurisdictions with lower median incomes."''
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Monkkonen, Paavo, and Michael Manville. "[http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2018-04WP.pdf Opposition to Development or Opposition to Developers?: Survey Evidence from Los Angeles County on Attitudes towards New Housing.]" Working paper. February 22, 2018.
Monkkonen, Paavo, and Michael Manville. "[http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/Documents/areas/ctr/ziman/2018-04WP.pdf Opposition to Development or Opposition to Developers?: Survey Evidence from Los Angeles County on Attitudes towards New Housing.]" Working paper. February 22, 2018.
<blockquote>'''''"Abstract:'''<br/> '''Problem, Research Strategy and Findings''':<br/> Opposition to new housing at higher densities is a pervasive problem in planning. Such opposition constrains the housing supply and undermines both affordability and sustainability in growing metropolitan areas. Relatively little research, however, examines the motives behind such opposition, and much of the research that does exist examines only opponents’ stated concerns, which may differ from their underlying reasons. We use a survey-framing experiment, administered to over 1,300 people in Los Angeles County, to measure the relative power of different arguments against new housing. We test the impact of common anti-housing arguments: about traffic congestion, neighborhood character, and strained local services. We also, however, introduce the idea that local residents might not like development because they do not like developers. We find strong evidence for this idea: opposition to new development increases by 20 percentage points when respondents see the argument that a developer is likely to earn a large profit from the building. This magnitude is double the increase in opposition associated with concerns about traffic congestion.''<br/> <br/> ''"'''Takeaway for Practice''':<br/> Housing opposition is often framed as a form of risk aversion. Our findings, however, suggest that at least some opposition to housing might be motivated not by&nbsp; residents’ fears of their own losses, but resentment of others’ gains. This finding in turn suggests the possibility that housing opposition could be influenced by vicious cycles of regulation and resentment. Many expensive cities are heavily-regulated, and in such cities only deep-pocketed and aggressive developers can afford to build. The prevalence of such developers might reinforce negative stereotypes about them, and fuel animus against them, further complicating efforts to build housing. Finally, such resentment might help explain the popularity of regulations—such as exactions—whose costs to developers are certain but whose benefits to society are less so. If residents derive satisfaction from seeing developers punished, the persistence of these programs in the face of ambiguous evidence about their efficacy becomes less mysterious."''</blockquote>
<blockquote>
'''''"Abstract:'''<br/> '''Problem, Research Strategy and Findings''':<br/> Opposition to new housing at higher densities is a pervasive problem in planning. Such opposition constrains the housing supply and undermines both affordability and sustainability in growing metropolitan areas. Relatively little research, however, examines the motives behind such opposition, and much of the research that does exist examines only opponents’ stated concerns, which may differ from their underlying reasons. We use a survey-framing experiment, administered to over 1,300 people in Los Angeles County, to measure the relative power of different arguments against new housing. We test the impact of common anti-housing arguments: about traffic congestion, neighborhood character, and strained local services. We also, however, introduce the idea that local residents might not like development because they do not like developers. We find strong evidence for this idea: opposition to new development increases by 20 percentage points when respondents see the argument that a developer is likely to earn a large profit from the building. This magnitude is<br/> double the increase in opposition associated with concerns about traffic congestion.''

''"'''Takeaway for Practice''':<br/> Housing opposition is often framed as a form of risk aversion. Our findings, however, suggest that at least some opposition to housing might be motivated not by&nbsp; residents’ fears of their own losses, but resentment of others’ gains. This finding in turn suggests the possibility that housing opposition could be influenced by vicious cycles of regulation and resentment. Many expensive cities are heavily-regulated, and in such cities only deep-pocketed and aggressive developers can afford to build. The prevalence of such developers might reinforce negative stereotypes about them, and fuel animus against them, further complicating efforts to build housing. Finally, such resentment might help explain the popularity of regulations—such as exactions—whose costs to developers are certain but whose benefits to society are less so. If residents derive satisfaction from seeing developers punished, the persistence of these programs in the face of ambiguous evidence about their efficacy becomes less mysterious."''
</blockquote>
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In Portland, Oregon, for example, the Residential Infill Project, a committee of residents, builders, city planners and low-income housing experts is researching changes to regulations on height and scale requirements for new homes, increased density as well as an easement to limits on demolitions. Portlanders are also exploring duplex and triplex [[Co-housing|co-housing]], [[Accessory_dwelling|accessory dwelling]] units, building around natural features like trees and converting large single household dwellings into apartments. While many YIMBY activists do call for increased density by building up and increasing floor area ratios, these low-rise strategies embraced by YIMBY advocates as ''part'' of the solution to the housing crunch run counter to NIMBY fears and rhetoric about the development of new high-rise condo buildings.
In Portland, Oregon, for example, the Residential Infill Project, a committee of residents, builders, city planners and low-income housing experts is researching changes to regulations on height and scale requirements for new homes, increased density as well as an easement to limits on demolitions. Portlanders are also exploring duplex and triplex [[Co-housing|co-housing]], [[Accessory_dwelling|accessory dwelling]] units, building around natural features like trees and converting large single household dwellings into apartments. While many YIMBY activists do call for increased density by building up and increasing floor area ratios, these low-rise strategies embraced by YIMBY advocates as ''part'' of the solution to the housing crunch run counter to NIMBY fears and rhetoric about the development of new high-rise condo buildings.


Other YIMBY strategies that speak to stated opponent concerns about affordable housing focus on lowering the cost to build affordable units by building on disused or underutilized municipal land (e.g. vacant lots and parking lots), lowering parking requirements for new developments and streamlining interior installations in units slated for low-income residents. Coupled with inclusionary zoning, linkage payments and increased density housing near public transportation hubs, this is the approach being examined in Cambridge, Massachusetts (see[http://www.abettercambridge.org/ A Better Cambridge]). In response, those raising concerns about new housing developments&nbsp;raise the concern of whether linkage payments and inclusionary zoning programs result in the creation of enough units (particularly two and three bedroom units for families versus smaller units geared towards singletons and childless couples) that rent for rates low enough to be affordable for those on low incomes. They also hold concerns that when developments are built with insuffucient parking that parking overflow can occur, resulting in residents circling to find a spot which slows traffic and adds to emissions. Actual reduction in car usage resulting from Transit Oriented Development&nbsp;may be minimal, especially in suburban locations with plentiful free parking or that are distant (e.g. >30 minutes) from a major employment center such as San Francisco.
Other YIMBY strategies that speak to stated opponent concerns about affordable housing focus on lowering the cost to build affordable units by building on disused or underutilized municipal land (e.g. vacant lots and parking lots), lowering parking requirements for new developments and streamlining interior installations in units slated for low-income residents. Coupled with inclusionary zoning, linkage payments and increased density housing near public transportation hubs, this is the approach being examined in Cambridge, Massachusetts (see&nbsp;[http://www.abettercambridge.org/ A Better Cambridge]). In response, those raising concerns about new housing developments&nbsp;raise the concern of whether linkage payments and inclusionary zoning programs result in the creation of enough units (particularly two and three bedroom units for families versus smaller units geared towards singletons and childless couples) that rent for rates low enough to be affordable for those on low incomes. They also hold concerns that when developments are built with insuffucient parking that parking overflow can occur, resulting in residents circling to find a spot which slows traffic and adds to emissions. Actual reduction in car usage resulting from Transit Oriented Development&nbsp;may be minimal, especially in suburban locations with plentiful free parking or that are distant (e.g. >30 minutes) from a major employment center such as San Francisco.


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