Game Theory of Zoning: Difference between revisions
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This article is a stub. The contents have now been incorporated into [[Collective_action_problems|Collective action problems]] |
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The London YIMBY group requested this page because it believes that understanding electoral game theory is key to getting YIMBY reforms enacted and keeping them in force. |
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[[Category:Zoning]] |
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Please add anything helpful! |
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=== References === |
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<cite>Hilber, Christian A.L. and Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas, December 2009, [http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0964.pdf http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0964.pdf]</cite> |
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<cite>Schleicher, David, City Unplanning</cite>, draft paper available at https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/area/workshop/leo/document/LEO_Schleicher_City_Unplanning.pdf |
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Latest revision as of 09:37, 2 October 2017
This article is a stub. The contents have now been incorporated into Collective action problems