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Collective action problems: Difference between revisions
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The term ‘'''collective action problem’''' describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The ideal solution is then to undertake this as a collective action, the cost of which is shared. An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is ‘belling the cat’. -Wikipedia, ‘[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action#Collective_action_problem Collective action].’
The situation of ‘NIMBY’ opposition to development is often characterized as a type of collective action problem, in which local/individual opposition defeats activities which arguably would benefit the city/region overall, and possibly even for the individuals presenting opposition.
The use of regulation to unnecessarily restrict the supply of housing can be seen as an example of a [https://offsettingbehaviour.blogspot.com/2009/09/transitional-gains-traps.html Tullock transitional gains trap]. In many jurisdictions, it is a particularly pernicious example because homeowners and those who vote with them may comprise a majority of the electorate. That makes it particularly difficult for the oppressed minority to obtain relief. [[#Overcoming_collective_action_problems|Solutions have been proposed]] to encourage at least some homeowners to vote in favour of reform.
Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the polity ''would ''personally benefit from greater development, or ''believe ''they would, or publicly admit that they believe so. The well-established [[Homevoter_hypothesis|homevoter hypothesis]] holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting housing -- to reduce demands on local amenities, avoid nuisances, and to help sustain and increase property values by restricting supply.▼
▲Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the polity ''would ''personally benefit from greater development, or ''believe ''they would, or publicly admit that they believe so. The well-established [[Homevoter_hypothesis|homevoter hypothesis]] holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting
A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,<sup>1</sup> and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.<sup>2</sup> ▼
▲A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,<sup>1</sup> and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.<sup>2</sup>
One of the rare formal papers on the political economy of housing demonstrated that the ‘most natural way to break the vicious circle of housing undersupply is to create simple legal instruments through which local communities can appropriate windfall gains.’<sup>3</sup>▼
In 2017, Brian Lund notes that housing has been called a ‘wicked’ problem; ‘complex, open-ended and intractable. “It is a really big issue”, said Martin Wolf [...] “that is, of course, why no politician dares touch it”’.<sup>3</sup> Lund quote goes on to quote Crookston that ‘the current housing agenda in Britain is characterised by a spectacular and jarring disassociation between a lot of analysis of serious problems, and an apparent inability to entertain or adopt credible solutions’. (p. 250)
[https://law.yale.edu/david-n-schleicher David Schleicher] has examined how collective action problems arise in getting approvals to build.<sup>4</sup> ▼
▲One of the rare formal papers on the political economy of housing demonstrated that the ‘most natural way to break the vicious circle of housing undersupply is to create simple legal instruments through which local communities can appropriate windfall gains.’<sup>
▲[https://law.yale.edu/david-n-schleicher David Schleicher] has examined how collective action problems arise in getting approvals to build.<sup>
=== Overcoming collective action problems ===
A number of authors have suggested possible mechanisms for overcoming collective actions problems in a YIMBY context. David Schleicher has suggested Tax Increment Local Transfers, or TILTs<sup>4</sup> and imposing binding ‘zoning budgets’.<sup>
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2. Bo Bengtsson (2015) "[http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2015.1057556 Between Structure and Thatcher. Towards a Research Agenda for Theory-Informed Actor-Related Analysis of Housing Politics, Housing Studies]", 30:5, 677-693, DOI: 10.1080/02673037.2015.1057556
3. Lund, Brian, ''[https://policypress.co.uk/housing-politics-in-the-united-kingdom Housing Politics in the United Kingdom – Power, Planning and Protest]'', Policy Press (2017), pp 249-50.
3. Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, ''The Political Economy of Housing Supply: Homeowners, Workers, and Voters'' (January 2007). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE514. Available at SSRN: [https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007]; later published as Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership versus Affordability, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2014, 6(1): 154–181 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154]▼
▲
4. Schleicher, David, ''City Unplanning'' (January 23, 2012). Yale Law Journal, Vol. 122, No. 7, pp. 1670-1737, May 2013; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-26. Available at SSRN: [https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990353 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990353] or [http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990353 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990353]
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