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Collective action problems: Difference between revisions
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The term
The situation of
Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the poliy ''would ''personally benefit from greater development, or ''believe ''they would, or publicly admit that they believe so. The well-established [[Homevoter_hypothesis|homevoter hypothesis]] holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting housing -- to reduce demands on local amenities, avoid nuisances, and to help sustain and increase property values by restricting supply.
A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,<sup>1</sup> and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.<sup>2</sup>
One of the rare formal papers on the political economy of housing
==== [https://law.yale.edu/david-n-schleicher David Schleicher] has examined how collective action problems arise in getting approvals to build.<sup>4</sup> ====
=== Overcoming collective action problems ===
A number of authors have suggested possible mechanisms for overcoming collective actions problems in a YIMBY context. David Schleicher has suggested Tax Increment Local Transfers, or TILTs<sup>4</sup> and imposing binding ‘zoning budgets’.<sup>5</sup> In a UK context, the London YIMBY group has suggested allowing single streets to vote to give themselves additional development rights.<sup>6</sup>
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2. Bo Bengtsson (2015) "[http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2015.1057556 Between Structure and Thatcher. Towards a Research Agenda for Theory-Informed Actor-Related Analysis of Housing Politics, Housing Studies]", 30:5, 677-693, DOI: 10.1080/02673037.2015.1057556
3. Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, ''The Political Economy of Housing Supply: Homeowners, Workers, and Voters'' (January 2007). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE514. Available at SSRN: [https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007]; later published as Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership versus Affordability, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2014, 6(1): 154–181 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154]
4. Schleicher, David, ''City Unplanning'' (January 23, 2012). Yale Law Journal, Vol. 122, No. 7, pp. 1670-1737, May 2013; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-26. Available at SSRN: [https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990353 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990353] or [http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990353 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990353]
5. Schleicher, David, ''Balancing the "Zoning Budget"'' (2011). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 4955
6. [https://londonyimby.org/policy London YIMBY campaign], [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/598c8b62be42d6f7f8e30ebe/1502382968482/John+Myers+-+YIMBY+-+Final.pdf Yes in my back yard – How to end the housing crisis, boost the economy and win more votes], Adam Smith Institute, August 2017
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