Collective action problems: Difference between revisions

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The situation of ‘NIMBY’ opposition to development is often characterized as a type of collective action problem, in which local/individual opposition defeats activities which arguably would benefit the city/region overall, and possibly even for the individuals presenting opposition. 
The situation of ‘NIMBY’ opposition to development is often characterized as a type of collective action problem, in which local/individual opposition defeats activities which arguably would benefit the city/region overall, and possibly even for the individuals presenting opposition. 


Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the poliy ''would ''personally benefit from greater development, or ''believe ''they would, or publicly admit that they believe so.  The well-established [[Homevoter_hypothesis|homevoter hypothesis]] holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting housing -- to reduce demands on local amenities, avoid nuisances, and to help sustain and increase property values by restricting supply.
Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the polity ''would ''personally benefit from greater development, or ''believe ''they would, or publicly admit that they believe so.  The well-established [[Homevoter_hypothesis|homevoter hypothesis]] holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting housing -- to reduce demands on local amenities, avoid nuisances, and to help sustain and increase property values by restricting supply.


A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,<sup>1</sup>&nbsp;and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.<sup>2</sup>&nbsp;
A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,<sup>1</sup>&nbsp;and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.<sup>2</sup>&nbsp;