Collective action problems

The term "collective action problem" describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The ideal solution is then to undertake this as a collective action, the cost of which is shared. An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is "belling the cat". -Wikipedia, "Collective action."

The situation of 'NIMBY' opposition to development is often characterized as a type of collective action problem, in which local/individual opposition defeats activities which arguably would benefit the city/region overall, and possibly even for the individuals presenting opposition. 

Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the poliy would personally benefit from greater development, or believe they would, or publicly admit that they believe so.  The well-established homevoter hypothesis holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting housing -- to reduce demands on local amenities, avoid nuisances, and to help sustain and increase property values by restricting supply.

A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,¹ and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.²

One of the rare papers on the political economy of housing formally demonstrated that the "most natural way to break the vicious circle of housing undersupply is to create simple legal instruments through which local communities can appropriate windfall gains."³

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References

• Hankinson, Michael. "When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism." Harvard JCHS Working Paper, February 2017.  http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism.
   
• Olson, Mancur (1965). The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674537514.
   
• Ostrom, Elinor (1990). Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521405997.

Footnotes

1. Bo Bengtsson (2009) "Political Science as the Missing Link in Housing Studies", Housing, Theory and Society, 26:1, 10-25, DOI: 10.1080/14036090802704106

2. Bo Bengtsson (2015) "Between Structure and Thatcher. Towards a Research Agenda for Theory-Informed Actor-Related Analysis of Housing Politics, Housing Studies", 30:5, 677-693, DOI: 10.1080/02673037.2015.1057556

3. Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, The Political Economy of Housing Supply: Homeowners, Workers, and Voters (January 2007). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE514. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007; later published as Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership versus Affordability, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2014, 6(1): 154–181 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154