Collective action problems: Difference between revisions

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The situation of ‘NIMBY’ opposition to development is often characterized as a type of collective action problem, in which local/individual opposition defeats activities which arguably would benefit the city/region overall, and possibly even for the individuals presenting opposition.
 
The use of regulation to unnecessarily restrict the supply of housing can be seen as an example of a [httpshttp://offsettingbehaviourblog.blogspotindependent.comorg/20092014/0911/06/gordon-tullock-and-the-transitional-gains-traps.htmltrap/ Tullock transitional gains trap]. In many jurisdictionsareas, it is a particularly pernicious example because homeowners and those who vote with them may comprisebe a majority of the electorate. That makes it particularly difficult for the oppressed minority to obtain relief. [[#Overcoming_collective_action_problems|Solutions have been proposed]] to encourage at least some homeowners to vote in favour of reform.
 
Note, there is a significant and intriguing question of if and to what degree individuals in the polity ''would ''personally benefit from greater development, or ''believe ''they would, or publicly admit that they believe so.  The well-established [[Homevoter_hypothesis|homevoter hypothesis]] holds that the homeowning voters who predominate in most local political bodies generally have, or believe themselves to have, a self interest in restricting housing—to reduce demands on local amenities, avoid nuisances, and to help sustain and increase property values by restricting supply.
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