Collective action problems: Difference between revisions
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A number of authors have suggested possible mechanisms for overcoming collective actions problems in a YIMBY context. David Schleicher has suggested Tax Increment Local Transfers, or TILTs<sup>4</sup> and imposing binding ‘zoning budgets’.<sup>6</sup> In a UK context, the London YIMBY group has suggested allowing single streets to vote to give themselves additional development rights.<sup>7</sup> London YIMBY has also [https://www.londonyimby.org/blog/2017/7/17/how-to-use-air-rights-to-improve-us-cities suggested that allocating air rights (Transferable Development Rights, or TDRs) to all registered voters], rather than just homeowners, could be a way to overcome collective action problems. |
A number of authors have suggested possible mechanisms for overcoming collective actions problems in a YIMBY context. David Schleicher has suggested Tax Increment Local Transfers, or TILTs<sup>4</sup> and imposing binding ‘zoning budgets’.<sup>6</sup> In a UK context, the London YIMBY group has suggested allowing single streets to vote to give themselves additional development rights.<sup>7</sup> London YIMBY has also [https://www.londonyimby.org/blog/2017/7/17/how-to-use-air-rights-to-improve-us-cities suggested that allocating air rights (Transferable Development Rights, or TDRs) to all registered voters], rather than just homeowners, could be a way to overcome collective action problems. |
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=== Game theory of zoning and land use === |
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Vicki Been and others wrote [http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_075062.pdf recently] (emphasis added): |
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== See also == |
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<q>Our stringent empirical testing of the predictions we argue follow from the growth machine and homevoter theories reveals surprising support for the homevoter–based model. New York City is not Scarsdale or Greenwich, for any number of reasons, but it too '''pays extraordinary attention to the interests of homeowners, even when those homeowners are a minority of voters'''. That finding demands attention from the academics, policymakers, and judges who seek to contain the potential land use decisions have to waste precious resources, drive up the cost of housing and of doing business, and threaten the equality of opportunity available to many families. Or to frame the call more positively, '''those who wish to harness the power of cities to foster innovation and problem-solving, reduce energy use and the associated global warming, and improve the quality of life residents enjoy sustainably, must consider how to control the influence risk-averse homeowners have over land use decisions that will interfere with those goals.'''</q> |
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[[Game_Theory_of_Zoning|Game Theory of Zoning]] |
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Game theory, particularly Prisoner's Dilemma, is discussed by David Schleicher in this 2012 interview in ''Forbes.''<br/> "[http://www.forbes.com/sites/markbergen/2012/03/05/the-stagnant-city-how-urban-politics-are-pushing-rents-up/#4655865b17d1 The Stagnant City: How Urban Politics Are Stalling Growth and Pushing Rents Up]." This is referenced in <br/> "[http://cityobservatory.org/the-prisoners-dilemma-of-local-only-planning/ The prisoner’s dilemma of local-only planning]," by Daniel Hertz, ''City Observatory ''15.9.2015. |
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''[https://openlibrary.org/books/OL5991785M/The_zoning_game The Zoning Game] ''by Richard Babcock, 1966, a witty classic of zoning literature, is not Game Theory, per se, but expresses some related spirit perhaps. |
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== References == |
== References == |
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*David Schleicher, <cite>City Unplanning</cite>, 122 Yale L.J. 1670 (2013), [http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162_m41e7ifa.pdf http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1162_m41e7ifa.pdf] |
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*Hankinson, Michael. "[http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism]." Harvard JCHS Working Paper, February 2017. [http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism]. |
*Hankinson, Michael. "[http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and NIMBYism]." Harvard JCHS Working Paper, February 2017. [http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/publications/when-do-renters-behave-homeowners-high-rent-price-anxiety-and-nimbyism]. |
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*Hilber, Christian A.L. and Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, <cite>On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US Metro Areas, December 2009, [http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0964.pdf http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0964.pdf]</cite> |
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*Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014), [http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_075062.pdf http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_075062.pdf] |
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*Ostrom, Elinor (1990). ''Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action''. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521405997. |
*Ostrom, Elinor (1990). ''Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action''. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521405997. |
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