Collective action problems: Difference between revisions

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A 2009 survey found that the literature on the political science (or political economy) challenges of achieving housing reform is very limited,<sup>1</sup>&nbsp;and argued that the economic incentives and institutional support for political scientists to study housing are insufficient, despite the important contributions that could be made. A later paper by the same author noted that the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock make the politics of housing particularly challenging.<sup>2</sup>
 
In 2017, Brian Lund notes that housing has been called a ‘wicked’ problem; ‘complex, open-ended and intractable. “It is a really big issue”, said Martin Wolf [...] “that is, of course, why no politician dares touch it”’.<sup>3</sup>&nbsp;Lund quote goes on to quote&nbsp;Crookston that ‘the current housing agenda in Britain is characterised by a spectacular and jarring disassociation between a lot of analysis of serious problems, and an apparent inability to entertain or adopt credible solutions’. (p. 250)
 
One of the rare formal papers on the political economy of housing demonstrated that the ‘most natural way to break the vicious circle of housing undersupply is to create simple legal instruments through which local communities can appropriate windfall gains.’<sup>4</sup>
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=== Overcoming collective action problems ===
 
A number of authors have suggested possible mechanisms for overcoming collective actions problems in a YIMBY context. David Schleicher has suggested Tax Increment Local Transfers, or TILTs<sup>45</sup>&nbsp;and imposing binding ‘zoning budgets’.<sup>6</sup>&nbsp;In a UK context, the London YIMBY group has suggested&nbsp;allowing single streets to vote to give themselves additional development rights.<sup>7</sup>&nbsp;London YIMBY has also [https://www.londonyimby.org/blog/2017/7/17/how-to-use-air-rights-to-improve-us-cities suggested that allocating air rights (Transferable Development Rights, or TDRs) to all registered voters], rather than just homeowners, could be a way to overcome collective action problems.
 
=== Game theory of zoning and land use ===
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4.&nbsp;Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, ''The Political Economy of Housing Supply: Homeowners, Workers, and Voters'' (January 2007). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. TE514. Available at SSRN:&nbsp;[https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1161007]; later published as Ortalo-Magné, François and Prat, Andrea, On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership versus Affordability, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2014, 6(1): 154–181 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.154]
 
45.&nbsp;Schleicher, David, ''City Unplanning'' (January 23, 2012). Yale Law Journal, Vol. 122, No. 7, pp. 1670-1737, May 2013; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-26. Available at SSRN:&nbsp;[https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990353 https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990353]&nbsp;or&nbsp;[http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990353 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990353]
 
56.&nbsp;Schleicher, David, ''Balancing the "Zoning Budget"''&nbsp;(2011). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 4955
 
67. [https://londonyimby.org/policy London YIMBY campaign], [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/598c8b62be42d6f7f8e30ebe/1502382968482/John+Myers+-+YIMBY+-+Final.pdf Yes in my back yard – How to end the housing crisis, boost the economy and win more votes], Adam Smith Institute, August 2017
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