Portland State University 2019 Homelessness report

cover of report

[originally part of article Right to housing ]

Portland State University Homelessness Research & Action Collaborative on August 21, 2019 issue a report, "Governance, Costs, and Revenue Raising to Address and Prevent Homelessness in the Portland Tri-County Region." [Zapata et al 2019]. 
 

Summary / analysis 

Introduction:

"This report takes a comprehensive look at the scale of homelessness and housing insecurity experienced in the Portland tri-county area. Our goal in producing this report is to help community members understand the scope and scale of the challenges we face when addressing homelessness and housing insecurity. We examine governance options, provide cost estimates for providing housing, supports, and services, and present revenue-raising options for our local governments to address homelessness and housing insecurity."

Expanded definition of 'homelessness' and widened scope to include precariously or unsuitably housed: 

"Many of the available counts of those experiencing homelessness use a narrow definition. We believe this leaves people behind. For example, the official Point-in-Time counts do not include those living doubled up, those sometimes described as the hidden homeless or precariously housed. This vulnerable population is sleeping on friends’ couches or cramming in unsafe numbers into bedrooms."

 

 

 

Right to Housing aspect

This report does not explicitly articulate a "Right to Housing" concept, but it notably uses broad definitions and makes wide estimates of how many people in the region experience homelessness in some form, or are considered vulnerable to falling into homelessness. By proposing government assistance, in the form of housing provision and rent assistance, for these entire populations, it in effect approaches an idea of "Right_to_housing." 

"This report takes a comprehensive look at the scale of homelessness and housing insecurity experienced in the Portland tri-county area. Our goal in producing this report is to help community members understand the scope and scale of the challenges we face when addressing homelessness and housing insecurity. We examine governance options, provide cost estimates for providing housing, supports, and services, and present revenue-raising options for our local governments to address homelessness and housing insecurity.

Before getting too far into the report, we want to make sure to note a few things. Many of the available counts of those experiencing homelessness use a narrow definition. We believe this leaves people behind. For example, the official Point-in-Time counts do not include those living doubled up, those sometimes described as the hidden homeless or precariously housed. This vulnerable population is sleeping on friends’ couches or cramming in unsafe numbers into bedrooms..."  

 

 

Public responses to report

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Questions / critique

Why use static, not dynamic dynamic figure for homeless population?

What are the implications of basing the cost estimates on a static figure for current homeless population, rather than current population plus observed or estimated typical rate of 'inflow' to homelessness? 

The report states: 

"The type of modeling needed to capture the inflow and outflow of people experiencing homelessness is complex, data intensive, and time consuming. We opted to go in the opposite direction, and created replicable, straightforward estimates completed in just a few months. Our goal was to provide a general sense of the number of households and associated costs, and we believe that adding layers of complexity where assumptions are added to assumptions would not get us to a better estimate."

Is that true? It seems there are simple estimates routinely given for rates of inflow into homelessness, based for example on considering counts of people who were placed into housing, versus subsequent Point in Time counts. In any case, we know this inflow is substantial, certainly nonzero, and so isn't any simple nonzero estimate a better estimate than zero?  The consequence of assuming zero inflow is a likely underestimate of response costs, perhaps to a major degree. 

In addition, in debates over homelessness, it is common for parties of all types to consider that there is steady inflow of people needing services; and potentially, that provision of services could motivate or facilitate greater use of those services, or an increasing population identifying / identified as in need of them. In fact, Portland / Multnomah County, and its Joint Office of Homeless Services, experienced a well-publicized apparent case of this with its family homeless shelter program in 2017-18: 

"The emergency shelter run by the nonprofit Human Solutions...funded by the city of Portland and Multnomah County through the Joint Office of Homeless Services, had a policy that was unique on the West Coast. It promised to provide a bed for every child that needed one. It didn’t turn any family away and had no wait list.  
     And on nights when all 130 beds were in use and the other roughly 50 beds dedicated to homeless families in Portland had people sleeping in them, the county paid for hotel rooms for the extra families.
     This no-turn-away policy was a point of pride for Multnomah County, which was working to expand shelter access in response to Portland’s housing crisis.
     When the number of homeless families sleeping on the street dropped in the county’s count of homeless people in 2017, it credited the no-turn-away shelter with making the difference. 
     Just a handful of other cities — including New York and Washington, D.C. — have similar policies. Massachusetts is the only state that has recognized a right to shelter for families.
     But while Multnomah County celebrated its no-turn-away policy, it wasn’t prepared to deal with the financial and practical challenges of managing it. 
     By late 2017, the no-turn-away policy had plunged Portland’s family shelter system into financial crisis because the number of families that needed a place to sleep kept rising.
     In February 2016, when the shelter first opened, it served about 150 people a night using the shelter and overflow space in a church across the street.
     That fall, the number of families at the shelter and the overflow space climbed to around 200 a night, and staff with the Joint Office of Homeless Services grew concerned that the shelter was dangerously overcrowded.
     So, the office authorized the shelter to provide motel vouchers to homeless families when the shelter filled. 
     Last June, the number of families in the system began to rise again. Over the summer, it doubled.
     By October 2017, the nightly census hit 468 people. The number of families staying in motels, paid for by the city and county, outnumbered the families at the shelter itself.
     'It frankly put our system into crisis. It became unsustainable for us,' said Mark Jolin, director of the Joint Office of Homeless Services, which coordinates shelter for Multnomah County and the city of Portland."  [Templeton 2018].

 

 

Why use static, not dynamic figure for housing-vulnerable population?

Likewise, how valid is it use a static figure for housing-vulnerable (107k people?) who might receive rental assistance? Could we make some simple/reasonable prediction of rate of inflow into this group, and include that as a baseline, rather than baselining on zero inflow? 

 

Wouldn't widely-expanded rental assistance raise rents generally?

What are the implications and credibility of assuming / modeling that large-scale rent assistance, given the Portland area's supply constraints or supply inelasticity.

cf Jennie Schuetz interview. 

 

Could large-scale new publicly funded housing crowd out other housing development? 

What are the implications and credibility of assuming / modeling that lthat large-scale new public-funded housing development wouldn't crowd out housing that would otherwise occur, creating a price-raising factor?

 

Why add new housing only by current conventional approaches?

Why would or should we assume that housing creation to address homelessness at large scale should be done all with current conventional housing forms? 
 

Don't policies driving overall housing cost levels need to be part of the policy advocated?

To what degree do the estimates of housing needs and remedy costs follow from general area housing prices, which are strongly affected by economic climate and general rate/type of housing creation? If this factor is large, then it seems policy recommendations concerning this general housing creation would be an integral part of this report/project's scope. 

 

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References 

• Templeton, Amelia. "How Portland Tried, And Failed, To Provide A Bed For All Its Homeless Children." Oregon Public Broadcasting, March 13, 2018. https://www.opb.org/news/article/portland-oregon-homeless-children-shelter-families/.
   
• Zapata MA,* Liu J,** Everett L, Hulseman P, Potiowsky T, & Willingham E. [2019]. Governance, Costs, and Revenue Raising to Address and Prevent Homelessness in the Portland Tri-County Region. Portland State University.https://www.pdx.edu/syndication/sites/www.pdx.edu.syndication/files/HRAC-NERC%20Final%20Draft%20JG%207AM8_20_2019.pdf.
  *First author & **second author. All other authors listed in alphabetical order. For questions, please contact: Marisa A. Zapata (mazapata@pdx.edu).
   
• Sand, Kaia. "To confront the housing crisis, it is time to think big." Street Roots (Portland, OR), 23 Aug 2019. https://news.streetroots.org/2019/08/23/confront-housing-crisis-it-time-think-big.